Colombia-Venezuela Relationship: Sister Nations or Rivals?

The relationship between Colombia and Venezuela is intricate, shaped by strong cultural and personal ties but also marred by longstanding historical and political disputes. These two countries, often referred to as ‘sister nations,’ share a common history dating back to their formation under the Spanish Empire. Despite this shared past, ideological differences in recent times have led to a mix of collaboration and conflict. The evolution of the Colombia-Venezuela relationship includes the early aspirations for a united Greater Colombia and extends to the modern-day issues and tensions that influence their interactions.

Colombia, Venezuela, and Simon Bolivar’s dream

Colombia and Venezuela were originally regions of New Granada, an administrative division of the Spanish colonial empire in the Americas. After being colonized for nearly three centuries, the Granadian provinces were eventually emancipated from Spanish rule in 1819. A key figure in their independence was Simon Bolivar, ‘El Libertador’ (The Liberator). Originating from Caracas, Venezuela, the military leader led the liberation movement across many South American territories, starting with New Granada. But beyond military command, Simon Bolivar also carried a vision: the union of Latin American nations into a single political entity. This project started with the creation of the Republic of Gran Colombia (Greater Colombia) in 1819, a federation comprising modern-day Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador and Panama. Despite his efforts, Simon Bolivar’s dream was short-lived, as Gran Colombia dissolved in 1831, shortly after his death.

To this day, the prolonged coexistence within the same political framework significantly influences the bilateral relations between Colombia and Venezuela, bringing to the forefront issues of collective memory and political heritage. Indeed, the demise of Gran Colombia has been attributed by both sides to internal power struggles, local political dynamics, and personal ambition. While Colombian narratives mainly blame General José Antonio Páez, leader of the Venezuelan separatist movement, for the federation’s collapse, Venezuela highlights the role of General Francisco de Paula Santander, another key figure in Colombian history, in destabilizing the young republic. Consequently, the destruction of Bolívar’s work is considered an ‘original sin’ affecting the bilateral relations between the two countries.

Colombia-Venezuela’s balanced relationship in the 20th century

After the collapse of the Republic of Gran Colombia, the relationship between Colombia and Venezuela, often called ‘sister nations,’ turned contentious. Early on, defining borders posed a significant challenge and remained a key issue for over 150 years. Land boundaries and river navigation disputes were eventually settled by the López de Mesa-Gil Borges treaty in 1941. However, disputes over maritime borders have led to several diplomatic tensions in recent years. A prominent instance was the Corveta Caldas incident in August 1987, when a Colombian warship entered the contested waters of the Gulf of Venezuela, sparking a crisis.

Despite these disputes, Colombia and Venezuela always managed to temper their relations through bilateral cooperation. Particularly in the second half of the 20th century, both nations successfully established quite advanced partnerships in numerous domains: economic collaboration, through initiatives like the G-3 and especially the Andean Pact, and also trade with an unprecedented boost from the 1990s. This cooperation was enabled by a mutual political willingness to prioritize economic cooperation over maritime sovereignty disputes, a process termed ‘desgolfización’. Furthermore, political cooperation was also manifested through the creation of mechanisms promoting cross-border cooperation, like the National Commissions on Colombian-Venezuelan Border Affairs in 1989, intended to facilitate development and cross-border exchanges, as well as combating trafficking. As such, this period coincides with an important emigration of Colombians to Venezuela.

Chavez & Uribe: the ideologization of the bilateral relationship

These relations, marked by both rivalry and cooperation, would take an unprecedented turn with the rise to power of Hugo Chavez (1999-2013) and Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010). Due to their deep political differences, these two ideologically distinct leaders would permanently alter the relations between their countries. Rising from the Venezuelan military, Hugo Chavez Frias was a leftist leader. Elected president in 1998, Hugo Chavez introduced a ‘Bolivarian’ socialist agenda, that is, a version of socialism adapted to the Venezuelan context, emphasizing national sovereignty, rejecting imperialism and economic liberalism, and aligning with Latin America’s far-left revolutionary movements.

While this new socialism took hold in Venezuela, a security-oriented and liberal right came to power in Colombia. In 2002, Alvaro Uribe Velez, a former senator and governor of the Antioquia department, ascended to Colombia’s presidency. His ideology, dubbed ‘Uribismo’, encompassed conservative, right-wing principles, emphasizing law, order, traditional values and economic liberalism, deeply contrasting with Hugo Chavez’s socialist Venezuela. As such, this ideological opposition quickly manifested in their bilateral relations, primarily within the context of the Colombian armed conflict.

The Colombian armed conflict

Following the unsuccessful negotiations with various far-left guerrillas conducted by his predecessor Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002), Alvaro Uribe decided to engage his country in total confrontation through the ‘Seguridad Democrática’ (Democratic Security) policy, a strictly military approach that prioritized armed resolution over the resolution of socio-economic issues. While Alvaro Uribe’s Colombia embarked on a relentless fight against the guerrillas, Hugo Chávez refrained from taking sides in the armed conflict and instead chose to treat both belligerents equally, leading to a spectacular and unprecedented deterioration in relations between the two countries. Surpassing mere neutrality, the Venezuelan president even showed sympathy towards the Colombian guerrillas, positioning himself as a mediator in contrast to Alvaro Uribe’s militaristic approach.

As such, several serious diplomatic crises occurred between 2004 and 2009. In December 2004, the capture of guerrilla Rodrigo Granda in Caracas by Colombian intelligence services led to the severing of commercial and diplomatic relations between the two countries. In 2007, diplomatic relations were once again frozen by the Venezuelan president after he was excluded from negotiations with the FARC. The situation escalated in March 2008, following the Colombian military’s execution of FARC spokesperson Raul Reyes in Ecuador. This violation of Ecuadorian sovereignty led Hugo Chavez to expel Colombian diplomatic staff and deploy 15,000 troops to the border. Finally, the relationship reached another low in July 2010, when Colombia reported to the Organization of American States that Venezuela was hosting Colombian guerrillas on its territory, leading to the closure of borders and the severance of diplomatic relations.

The Venezuelan crisis

The Venezuelan crisis marked a new phase of deterioration in the Colombia-Venezuela relationship. The crisis erupted during the presidency of Juan Manuel Santos Calderon (2010-2018). Former Minister of Defense under Alvaro Uribe, he initially distinguished himself from his predecessor by initiating a rapprochement with President Chavez, notably by involving Venezuela in the peace process with the FARC that began in 2012. However, Chavez’s death and the inauguration of Nicolas Maduro in 2013 prematurely ended this brief warming in relations.

Firstly, because of the spillover of the Colombian armed conflict into Venezuelan territory, with the establishment of the extreme-left guerrilla ELN, as well as paramilitary groups like the Gulf Clan or the Rastrojos, particularly active in illegal mining and drug trafficking. Secondly, due to Colombia’s stance on the Venezuelan political crisis. In what can be seen as a response to Chavez’s pro-guerrilla stance, President Santos decisively positioned himself in the crisis by hosting Henrique Capriles, then the Venezuelan opposition leader, in Bogota in May 2013. As part of the diplomatic escalation that followed between the two countries, Nicolas Maduro notably deported over 20,000 Colombians from Venezuela in August 2015, triggering a humanitarian and diplomatic crisis.

Donald Trump’s inauguration as President in January 2017 significantly worsened the economic and political crisis in Venezuela, due to his administration’s determined effort to overthrow the Venezuelan leader. This ‘maximal pressure’ policy encompassed a range of strategies, from political pressure and economic sanctions to backing military operations (Operation Gedeon for instance). As such, both Juan Manuel Santos and his successor Ivan Duque Márquez (2018-2022), a senator with strong ties to former President Alvaro Uribe, adopted Donald Trump’s hardline policy, positioning Colombia as a pivotal actor in his strategy.

Indeed, President Ivan Duque never recognized Nicolas Maduro as Venezuela’s legitimate president, preferring opposition leader Juan Guaido. The crisis peaked with the ‘Venezuela Live Aid’ concert announced by Ivan Duque, scheduled for February 22, 2019, in the border town of Cúcuta. Reuniting several international stars like Juanes and Maluma, the concert should have culminated in the delivery of humanitarian aid to Venezuela. Nevertheless, following Nicolas Maduro’s border closure, the aid convoys were forcibly turned back, leading the Venezuelan President to announce an attempted coup. This clash led Nicolas Maduro to sever diplomatic ties and expel Colombian diplomatic staff, on February 23, 2019, marking another significant low in bilateral relations.

Gustavo Petro and the current state of the bilateral relationship

The arrival of Gustavo Petro ultimately led to the normalization of Colombia’s relationship with Venezuela, after years of open conflict. On August 28, 2022, three weeks after his Presidential inauguration, Colombia and Venezuela restored their diplomatic relations, leading to the reopening of the border between the two countries on January 1, 2023. Indeed, restoring the bilateral relationship with Venezuela has been one of Gustavo Petro’s foreign policy top priorities. As such, he publicly advocated for the removal of sanctions against Venezuela and conducted an official visit to the country in November 2023, marking the first visit by a Colombian President since Juan Manuel Santos in November 2011.

Over the last year, the cooperation between Venezuela and Colombia has been significantly reinvigorated, for instance with the reopening of air transport between the two countries, the export of vehicles manufactured in Colombia to Venezuela, and agreements on hydrocarbon exploitation. In this context, as Colombia is currently experiencing a drought that endangers its hydroelectric generation capacity, President Petro is considering importing gas from Venezuela to meet the national energy demand.

On the other hand, despite Gustavo Petro’s conciliatory approach and eagerness to restore diplomatic ties, he has been criticized for his apparent inaction concerning Venezuela’s political situation. As such, during the diplomatic crisis between Guyana and Venezuela, where the latter threatened to invade the Guyanese Essequibo region, Gustavo Petro was noted for his passivity. Similarly, the Colombian president has maintained a low profile regarding the suppression of the Venezuelan opposition in the context of the presidential campaign.

To conclude, although diplomatic relations between Colombia and Venezuela are now normalized, they are still overshadowed by the two decades of diplomatic and political conflicts. Today, one of the primary unresolved issues is the fate of the 2.8 million Venezuelan migrants in Colombia, as Nicolas Maduro has recently called for their return to Venezuela. Security concerns also persist, with Colombian illegal armed groups continuing operations near the Venezuelan border, and Venezuelan criminal gangs now making their presence felt on the streets of Colombia’s major cities.