Colombia’s Peace Process: Progress, Setbacks, and the Armed Groups Still Shaping the Nation’s Future

Colombia’s pursuit of peace has become one of the longest-running and most complex processes in the modern world. Few countries have experienced such a prolonged internal conflict, fueled not only by ideology but also by powerful illegal economies. Over the decades, peace has been negotiated, promised, delayed, and sometimes betrayed. To understand where Colombia stands today, it is crucial to examine how each government has managed the challenge, who the armed players are, and what obstacles remain before peace can finally take hold.

A historic turning point: the 2016 peace deal with FARC

The signing of the 2016 peace deal between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) was hailed globally as a groundbreaking step. President Juan Manuel Santos, who received the Nobel Peace Prize for his role, called it “a new chapter” for the country. The deal ended more than five decades of insurgency by FARC, a group that at its peak controlled large parts of Colombia’s rural territory and commanded more than 20,000 fighters.

The agreement was ambitious. It created the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP), a transitional justice mechanism aimed at uncovering the truth about war crimes while offering reduced sentences in exchange for full confessions. It promised comprehensive rural reform, land redistribution, and new opportunities for Colombia’s most marginalized farmers. It even allowed ex-combatants to participate in politics, leading to the creation of the Comunes party — a controversial but symbolic step toward reconciliation.

Yet from the start, implementation faced hurdles. The public narrowly rejected the first version of the deal in a referendum, showing how divided the country was over making concessions to FARC. Although Santos later adjusted and ratified the agreement in Congress, the political polarization around the deal weakened its legitimacy for years to come.

Government obstacles across administrations

Each administration since 2016 has handled the peace deal differently, creating a stop-and-go process that left communities uncertain about Colombia’s future.

Santos: visionary but rushed

Santos’ vision was historic, but his biggest limitation was time. With only two years left in his term after the signing, he could not ensure the full rollout of rural reform or the security guarantees promised to communities and ex-combatants. His Nobel Prize victory gave him international prestige, but at home, many Colombians — especially victims of FARC violence — remained skeptical about forgiving and reintegrating former guerrillas.

Duque: a skeptical administrator

President Ivan Duque, who governed from 2018 to 2022, came from the right-wing Democratic Center party led by former president Alvaro Uribe, a staunch critic of the peace deal. Duque argued that the accord was too lenient on guerrilla leaders accused of atrocities. While his government did not dismantle the agreement, critics say he allowed it to stagnate. Budgets for reintegration projects were cut, and implementation of land reforms slowed dramatically.

During Duque’s presidency, violence against social leaders and former combatants spiked. More than 300 ex-FARC members who had signed the deal were killed, often by criminal groups seeking to prevent them from reclaiming land or political influence. The United Nations repeatedly urged his government to strengthen security guarantees, but the lack of progress deepened mistrust.

Petro: Total Peace or total risk?

When Gustavo Petro, a former guerrilla member of the M-19 movement, became Colombia’s first leftist president in 2022, he placed peace at the center of his agenda. His “Total Peace” policy seeks to negotiate not just with one group but with all armed players simultaneously — guerrillas, paramilitaries, and cartels. Petro has argued that peace must be comprehensive: “If we leave one group out, the war will continue under another name.”

His administration has reopened talks with ELN, engaged with FARC dissidents, and even floated dialogues with the Gulf Clan. However, critics such as former president Uribe warn that negotiating with drug cartels risks blurring the line between political insurgency and organized crime. The risk, they argue, is legitimizing mafias that have no ideology beyond profit.

Who are Colombia’s armed groups today?

Although FARC demobilization was historic, Colombia remains home to a patchwork of armed organizations that compete for control over drug routes, mining areas, and communities.

ELN: decentralized and resilient

The National Liberation Army (ELN) is now Colombia’s largest guerrilla group, with an estimated 3,000–5,000 fighters. Unlike FARC, which operated under a centralized hierarchy, ELN is fragmented. Its regional “fronts” often act independently, which complicates peace talks.

ELN is heavily entrenched in border regions with Venezuela, where weak state presence allows them to thrive. They fund operations through drug trafficking, extortion, and illegal mining. Public figures such as peace negotiator Otty Patiño have admitted that the ELN’s lack of unified command makes ceasefires hard to enforce, as some fronts ignore national-level agreements.

FARC dissidents: the shadow of a broken deal

Not all FARC members accepted the 2016 peace accord. Dissidents who never disarmed, along with some who rearmed after demobilizing, now form a powerful network known collectively as FARC dissidents. The most notorious faction, the Second Marquetalia, is led by Ivan Marquez, a former top FARC commander who abandoned the peace process in 2019.

These dissident groups operate across the Amazon, the Pacific coast, and the Venezuelan border. With around 3,000 fighters, they remain deeply involved in cocaine production and trafficking. For many Colombians, the persistence of these groups symbolizes both the fragility of peace and the high stakes of incomplete implementation.

Gulf Clan: criminal powerhouse

The Clan del Golfo or Gulf Clan, also known as the Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AGC), represents the evolution of paramilitary structures into a modern drug cartel. With a presence in more than 20 departments and thousands of members, they control key routes for cocaine shipments to Central America and the U.S.

Unlike guerrilla groups, the Clan del Golfo has no political ideology. Its structure resembles that of Mexican cartels, with a strict hierarchy and powerful financial networks. Security experts often describe it as Colombia’s most dangerous criminal threat. Negotiating with them is controversial, as many politicians argue it could be seen as granting political status to a mafia.

Bacrim and local militias

Beyond these major players, smaller “bandas criminales” (Bacrim) operate in both rural and urban areas. These groups engage in extortion, illegal logging, and micro-trafficking. While less powerful nationally, their control over neighborhoods and towns makes them a direct threat to everyday life.

Which groups has Colombia negotiated with?

President Petro has placed dialogue at the heart of his policy, though progress has varied:

• With ELN, peace talks resumed in 2023 after years of stalemate. A bilateral ceasefire was signed, but continued kidnappings and attacks by the group have strained trust. Senator Maria Jose Pizarro, a close Petro ally, has urged patience, saying, “Peace with ELN is a marathon, not a sprint.”
• With FARC dissidents, localized ceasefires have been attempted, but enforcement is shaky. Many fighters distrust the state, recalling broken promises from the original peace accord.
• With the Clan del Golfo, the government has explored a process of “judicial submission,” where members would face reduced sentences in exchange for dismantling their networks. Critics, however, say this risks normalizing cartel influence in Colombian politics.

Why is peace so hard to achieve?

Several deep-rooted factors continue to undermine peace efforts:

• Drug trafficking remains the main driver. Cocaine profits sustain armed groups, giving them both economic and military strength.
• Weak state presence means vast areas of Colombia have no reliable police, justice, or infrastructure. Armed groups often become the de facto authority.
• Political polarization creates instability. Each administration redefines the peace process, preventing continuity. Former negotiator Humberto de la Calle has repeatedly warned that without bipartisan support, peace “will never move from paper to reality.”
• Targeting of social leaders continues to destabilize rural areas. More than 1,500 community leaders have been killed since 2016, according to human rights groups. Their deaths weaken local movements pushing for reform.

The human face of Colombia’s conflict

Numbers tell part of the story, but the human side is equally important. Farmers cultivating coca often do so out of economic necessity, not allegiance to armed groups. Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities remain disproportionately affected, facing forced displacement and violence.

Ex-combatants who chose peace also face risks. While some have rebuilt their lives through farming cooperatives or entrepreneurship, others have been assassinated, showing the danger of leaving the battlefield without solid protection. For victims, the Truth Commission established under the 2016 deal has given space to share stories, but reparations remain slow.

Is “Total Peace” Colombia’s best chance yet?

Petro’s “Total Peace” is bold, but it is also fragile. Supporters argue that negotiating with all groups at once is the only realistic way to reduce violence in a fragmented conflict. Critics, like former president Andres Pastrana, caution that it risks rewarding criminality.

Ultimately, success will depend on the state’s ability not just to sign agreements but to bring real transformation — roads, schools, health care, and justice — to rural Colombia. Without these, any ceasefire risks being temporary.

Colombia has achieved milestones — most notably the demobilization of FARC — but peace remains unfinished. ELN, dissidents, and cartels show that the fight is far from over. Yet, every dialogue table and every ceasefire reflects a society that refuses to give up on peace.

As Humberto de la Calle once said, “Peace is not perfect. Peace is not easy. But peace is always better than war.” For Colombia, the challenge is no longer whether peace is possible, but whether it can be sustained across generations.